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Abstract
To understand hospital policies and practices as the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated, the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
(SHEA) conducted a survey through the SHEA Research Network (SRN). The survey assessed policies and practices around the optimization
of personal protection equipment (PPE), testing, healthcare personnel policies, visitors of COVID-19 patients in relation to procedures, and
types of patients. Overall, 69 individual healthcare facilities responded in the United States and internationally, for a 73% response rate.
(Received 17 May 2020; accepted 20 June 2020)
In the past 40 years, healthcare epidemiologists have led responses to
community and healthcare outbreaks of novel pathogens, including
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), novel influenza A virus
(H1N1), and Ebola virus, in addition to the increased prevalence
of antibiotic-resistant pathogens. Now they are handling novel coro-
navirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic responses in facilities
across the world, adapting infection prevention and control practi-
ces rapidly to save lives while optimizing the use of supplies essential
to patient care and healthcare worker safety.
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a unique set of
challenges, well beyond the rapid global spread of the severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). These
unprecedented circumstances have demanded both careful
thought as well as creativity by healthcare epidemiologists and
infection prevention and control teams. While contending with
the implications of presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmis-
sion1 among other uncertainties, the healthcare experience in the
United States has been characterized by shortages of personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE), hand hygiene products, diagnostic tests,
and test reagents, as well as breakdowns in the supply chain.2,3
These challenges have driven hospitals to enact unprecedented
policies—from reprocessing disposable N95 respirators to the
3-dimensional printing of face shields.
Additionally, recommendations issued by public health author-
ities and professional societies have differed in key areas as the
pandemic accelerated, particularly related to the type of
respiratory protection to be worn in different settings and the
indications for diagnostic testing. Facilities have had to rapidly
identify and implement practices in the absence of unified guid-
ance from authorities while providing reassurance to healthcare
personnel (HCP) across sectors and roles when approaches
differed from those issued by their trusted sources. In March
and April 2020, professional societies continued to issue guidance
and recommendations with the intent, in part, of helping their
members advocate for access to the limited supply of PPE and
diagnostic tests for procedures and scenarios.
The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA)
surveyed the SHEAResearchNetwork (SRN) in April 2020 regard-
ing some of these most challenging aspects of the pandemic. The
findings show the “what,” but not the “why.” For example, the rea-
soning behind a facility’s decisions about precisely what PPE HCP
should wear in specific circumstances may have been based on PPE
stewardship, shortages, state and local laws, or other reasons. The
results of the survey provide a “point-in-time” snapshot of a rap-
idly changing landscape and insight into how hospital epidemiol-
ogists from SRNmember institutions have made swift adjustments
during this crisis to help ensure patient and healthcare worker
safety during the pandemic.
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Methods
With this SRN project, SHEA aimed to obtain an aggregated
picture of common and novel approaches being taken by infection
prevention teams to mitigate COVID-19 transmission risk during
a time of extensive constraints and emerging scientific knowledge
to understand how the pandemic was affecting facilities and to
provide a resource to other institutions facing similar challenges.
Conducted during April 2020, the survey asked hospital epidemi-
ologists and infectious diseases specialists how they were adapting
their facilities’ policies to match the growing body of evidence
about SARS-CoV-2. The survey collected data pertaining to the
challenges brought by product, equipment, and testing shortages.
It was limited to 1 response per SRN facility; thus, responses
represent the policies and practices of individual facilities, not
individual people.
The SRN is a collaborative research consortium made up of
95 individual US and international healthcare facilities, each with
a dedicated SRN principal investigator who oversees the facility’s
response to research projects issued by the SRN. Overall, 91% of
SRN facilities have infection control programs, with an average
of 1.6 hospital epidemiologists and 5.3 infection preventionists.
Typically, these facilities respond to 6–10 SRN research projects
per year. Since the SRN was established in 2012, it has conducted
nearly 50 research projects, and ~80% have been published in peer-
reviewed literature.
In April 2020, SHEA created an electronic survey via the Survey
Gizmo platform that was sent to SRN facilities on April 11, 15, 22,
and 23, 2020. The week before it was launched, it was reviewed by
current and former members of the SHEA Guidelines Committee
and several authors of the Outbreak Response Training Program
(ORTP) and the Prevention Course in Healthcare-Associated
Infections Knowledge and Control (Prevention CHKC). The sur-
vey consisted of 21 questions and was estimated by the survey tool
to require 17minutes to complete (Appendix 1 online). It included
a range of questions on current practices, and 5 matrices assessed
PPE use for healthcare personnel (HCP), PPE optimization
strategies, ethical considerations, visitor policies, and HCP policies
in the context of use within the facility’s units, types of patients
(eg, suspected or confirmed for COVID-19), and types of
procedures.
The survey closed on April 23, 2020. Duplicates were removed,
and the data were exported to Excel software (Microsoft,
Redmond, WA) for analysis. SRN facilities are identified by an
identification number (ID). If the ID appeared twice in the data
export, these rows were assessed for completeness. Each facility
has 1 SRN principal investigator who is responsible for obtaining
the facility’s response; therefore, duplicate data rows usually indi-
cate earlier incomplete response(s), and this was the case for this
survey. Basic information about the SRN facilities was linked in
aggregate to the survey findings using the SRN ID, and identifying
information was removed.
The author panel was composed of SHEA Research Committee
and Guidelines Committee members. Additionally, 2 consultants
with expertise in data analysis and communications provided the
first draft.
Results
The survey (Appendix 1 online) had a response rate of 73%
(69 of 95): 58 healthcare facilities from the United States and
Canada and 11 facilities located internationally.
Facility types
Of the responding hospitals, 57 had, through participation in the
SRN, hospital-level information regarding the type and size of the
hospital on file. Of these, 38 (67%) were academic medical centers
or other teaching hospitals, 11 (19%) were community hospitals
(8 with and 3 without an academic affiliation), and 7 (12%) were
other types of hospitals, including Veterans’ Affairs hospitals,
federal nonmilitary hospitals, and children’s hospitals. The total
bed size was widely distributed (Table 1).
Geographic distribution
Most responses (78%) were from theUnited States, representing 30
states; 4 responses (6%) were from Canada; 3 were from Ontario;
and 1 was from British Columbia. Outside North America, the
SRN received responses from Brazil (n= 1), Egypt (n= 1), India
(n= 2), Kenya (n= 1), Palestinian Territory (n= 1), the
Republic of Korea (n= 1), Spain (n= 2), and Turkey (n= 2).
COVID-19 patient prevalence
Of 66 respondents to this portion of the survey, 23 (35%) reported
<5% of COVID-19 diagnostic tests being positive, 27 (41%)
reported 6%–15% of tests being positive, 7 (11%) reported 16%–25%
being positive, and 9 (14%) reported >25% being positive. Among
hospitals in the United States and Canada, the average statewide or
province-wide rate of reported COVID-19 cases was 48.2 cases per
10,000 people (standard deviation, 46.3). A heavily skewed distribution
consisted of a few states or provinces experiencing severe outbreaks
(eg, New York), whereas most localities had rates relatively close
to the mean. The authors regressed the hospital-level test positiv-
ity rate identified by the respondent, with the statewide cumula-
tive prevalence rate of confirmed COVID-19 cases (confirmed
cases per state population). A 1-unit increase in the hospital
COVID-19 test positivity rate (ie, from <5% to 6%–15%) was
associated with an increased statewide COVID-19 rate of 28.32
cases per 10,000 people (95% confidence interval [CI], 18.39–
38.24).4,5 The survey did not assess whether hospitals had expe-
rienced a surge of patients.
Personal protective equipment
Respondents assessed the status of PPE in their facilities on
a 5-point scale from “sustainable for pandemic” (score of 5) to
“crisis level (almost out/none)” (score of 1). Averaged among all
respondents, supply levels scored as follows: gloves (score, 4),
eye coverings (3.7), surgical masks (3.6), respirators (3.5), and
gowns (3.4). Of 60 facilities, 24 (40%) assessed their supply of res-
pirators as being “limited” (expecting improvements or expecting
Table 1. SHEA Research Network (SRN) Facilities by Bed Size
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declines) to “crisis level” (almost out/none), 9 (15%) assessed their
supply as “sustainable for the pandemic,” and 27 (45%) assessed
their supply as “adequate for the current situation.” The question
did not distinguish among different types of respirators. Of the
60 facilities, 27 (45%) assessed their gown supplies as “limited”
to “crisis level,” 9 (15%) assessed their gown supply as “sustainable
for the pandemic,” and 24 (40%) assessed it as “adequate for the
current situation.”
Universal masking
Approaches to the optimization of PPE use by HCP varied by
settings of care and supply availability (Table 2). Of the 69
responding SRN facilities, 41 (59%) reported that their PPE strat-
egies included universal respirator use by HCP in certain units,
such as those dedicated to COVID-19 patients, the intensive care
unit (ICU), or the emergency department (ED). Of the 69 respond-
ing institutions, 28 (41%) used surgical masks in all clinical care
areas, including ambulatory areas, and 36 (~52%) used universal
surgical masking throughout their entire facility. Higher levels
of COVID-19 prevalence had a positive but not significant
association with universal respirator use in facilities with higher
COVID-19 test positivity rates (odds ratio [OR], 1.69; 95% CI,
0.94–3.04).
Of the 69 facilities that responded to the survey, 43 (62%) had
patients put on masks before HCP enter their rooms, and 25 of
these 43 (58%) used this approach throughout the facility.
Among the 24 facilities that assessed their respirator supply as
“limited” to “crisis-level,” 12 (50%) had universal HCP respirator
use in place in certain units (eg, COVID-19, ICU, or ED), and no
facilities reported universal HCP respirator use elsewhere in the
facility. Among these same 24 facilities, 23 (96%) used universal
HCP surgical masking, and 16 of these 23 facilities (70%) used this
practice throughout the entire facility.
PPE optimization strategies
SRN facilities reported several strategies in response to limited
supplies and availability of PPE (Table 2).
1. Extended use. The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) defines extended use as the practice of
wearing the same N95 respirator for repeated close contact with
several patients, without removal between patient encounters,
in situations where multiple patients are infected with the same
respiratory pathogen and patients are placed together.6 Of 69
responding facilities, 47 (68%) used 1 or more strategies involving
the extended use of respirators. Having HCP in certain units
wear the same respirator for 1 day was the most frequently cited
strategy; it was utilized by 36 SRN facilities (52%). When not in
use, 33 facilities (48%) reported that their HCP stored their respi-
rators in a paper bag. This question did not distinguish among
types of respirators.
Among the 24 facilities that assessed their respirator supply as
“limited” to “crisis level,” 17 (71%) practiced some form of
extended respirator use. Of the 27 facilities that assessed their gown
supply as “limited” to “crisis level,” 16 (59%) practiced extended
gown use or reuse.
2. Self-producing. In the “other” field in the question regarding
self-producing test components, 9 of the 69 SRN respondents
(13%) wrote in that they were self-producing PPE due to shortages,
including face shields (n= 5), eye shields (n= 2), gowns (n= 1),
surgical masks (n= 1), and coveralls (n= 2).
3. Reprocessing. Nearly half (n= 33) of the responding facilities
indicated that they reprocessed respirators. Both the use of reproc-
essing and planning to do so had positive but not significant asso-
ciations with increased COVID-19 test positivity rates (OR, 1.46;
95% CI, 0.84–2.52 and OR, 1.13; 95% CI, 0.66–1.94, respectively).
Of the 69 respondents, 23 (33%) indicated that they were reproc-
essing respirators with vaporized hydrogen peroxide. Reprocessing
with ultraviolet irradiation (n= 11) and ethylene oxide (n= 3)
were less common. One respondent wrote in the “other” field
that their facility used moist heat for 30 minutes to reprocess
respirators.
Nasopharyngeal swabs
For HCP performing in-room collection of nasopharyngeal (NP)
swab specimens from suspected or confirmed COVID-19 patients,
44 facilities (64%) recommendedN95 respirators or the equivalent,
identified in the survey as N95s, powered air purifying respirators
(PAPRs), or half-mask respirators, which purify air with cartridges











Universal HCP respirator use 41 (59.4) 0 0 41 (59.4)
Universal HCP surgical masking 5 (7.2) 28 (40.6) 36 (52.2) 63 (91.3)
Extended Use
Respirator extended use, 1 d 26 (37.7) 6 (8.7) 5 (7.2) 36 (52.2)
Respirator extended use, >1 d 12 (17.4) 9 (13.0) 6 (8.7) 25 (36.2)
Respirator extended use with surgical
mask or cloth mask
12 (17.4) 5 (7.2) 3 (4.3) 17 (24.6)
Gown extended use 7 (10.1) 6 (8.7) 6 (8.7) 19 (27.5)
Reprocessing
Respirator reprocessing by vaporized hydrogen peroxide 11 (15.9) 7 (10.1) 8 (11.6) 23 (33.3)
Respirator reprocessing by ultraviolet irradiation 6 (8.7) 4 (5.8) 3 (4.3) 11 (15.9)
Respiratory reprocessing by ethylene oxide 1 (1.4) 1 (1.4) 1 (1.4) 3 (4.3)
Note. HCP, healthcare personnel.
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built into a rubber mask covering the nose and chin, based on
“actual circumstances/supplies in the facility” (Table 3). Overall,
57 facilities (82%) recommended eyewear such as shields or gog-
gles and 34 (49%) recommended a N95 respirator or equivalent
with the eyewear. In addition, 24 facilities (35%) recommended
a surgical mask with the eyewear, and 1 (1%) recommended
eyewear (presumably a face shield) alone. The survey did not
ask whether in-room nasopharyngeal swabs occurred in nega-
tive-pressure rooms. Also, 4 facilities (6%) used respirators for
outdoor nasopharyngeal swab collection.
Other procedures
Of 64 facilities, 36 (56%) recommended that HCP wear additional
PPE for certain procedures on patients not suspected of COVID-
19, that is, beyond the requirement for standard precautions
(Table 3). These enhanced precautions had a positive but not
significant association with higher test positivity rates (OR, 1.57;
95% CI, 0.87–2.81).
Moreover, 95% of SRN facilities, based on their current levels
of supplies, recommended that HCP wear respirators (N95,
PAPR, or half-mask respirator) for intubation, extubation, or
bronchoscopy for confirmed or suspected COVID-19 patients.
Approximately 90% of facilities recommended that HCP wear
respirators for ear, nose, and throat (ENT) scope procedures
and surgeries. More than 70% of SRN facilities recommended that
HCP wear N95 respirators or the equivalent for the upper and
lower airway procedures for suspected or confirmed COVID-19
patients. Moreover, 46 of the 69 SRN facilities (67%) recom-
mended that HCP wear respirators for tracheostomy, and 37
(54%) recommended that HCP wear respirators for chest tube
placement.
For patients not suspected of COVID-19, N95s or the equiva-
lent were recommended for intubation by 26 of 36 SRN facilities
(72%), for bronchoscopy by 25 of 36 SRN facilities 69%), for
extubation by 24 of 36 SRN facilities (67%), for ENT surgery by
22 of 36 SRN facilities (61%), and for both bag masking and
ENT scope by 20 of 36 SRN facilities (56%).
Testing availability
In total, 64 facilities responded to the questions regarding testing
for COVID-19. Of these 64 facilities, 52 (81%) reported having
access to in-house testing for COVID-19. Among 51 facilities that
indicated the turnaround time for COVID-19 diagnostic test
results, 22 (43%) reported <6 hours, 10% reported 7–12 hours,
10% reported 13–24 hours, and 18% reported >24 hours.
Overall, 18 (26%) indicated that they self-produced test compo-
nents: 13 (72%) self-produced viral transport media, 11 (61%)
self-produced viral collection swabs, and 3 (16%) self-produced
collection tubes due to shortages.
Diagnostic testing
Patients with respiratory symptoms were most commonly tested
for COVID-19 in 65 of 66 facilities (98%), followed by those
with isolated fever, who were tested in 57 of 66 facilities (86%).
Those with gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms were tested in 40 of
66 facilities (61%), and asymptomatic patients undergoing certain
procedures were tested in 42 of 66 facilities (64%). At the time of
the survey, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
recommended testing of patients with symptoms according to
3 priority categories.7 The CDC defined symptoms of COVID-19
as “fever, cough, shortness of breath,” which it expanded on April
17, 2020, to also include “difficulty breathing, chills, repeated shaking
with chills, muscle pain, headache, sore throat, and new loss of taste
or smell”8 (Appendix 2 online). The survey was conducted before the
publication of the InfectiousDiseases Society of AmericaGuidelines on
the Diagnosis of COVID-19, which conditionally recommends testing
of asymptomatic individuals before major time-sensitive surgeries.9
Preprocedural testing
Of 66 facilities, 42 (64%) reported testing hospitalized (n= 41) and
nonhospitalized (n= 16) asymptomatic patients prior to certain
procedures (Table 4). Respondents wrote in the procedures for
which their facility tested asymptomatic patients; therefore, the
procedures listed in Table 4 are categorized into common types
but were not defined in the survey. Procedures specified by respon-
dents are noted in the right column of Table 4.
Testing before discharge
Of 66 facilities, 32 (49%) tested hospitalized (n= 30) and nonho-
spitalized (n= 9) asymptomatic patients prior to discharge to skilled
nursing facilities and long-term acute-care hospitals. Also, 22 of these
66 facilities (33%) tested hospitalized asymptomatic patients prior
to discharge to outpatient hemodialysis units. Testing prior to
discharge was associated with increased COVID-19 test positivity
rates for discharge to outpatient hemodialysis units (OR, 1.92;
95% CI, 1.07–3.45) but not to skilled nursing facilities (OR, 1.36;
95% CI, 0.79–2.34).
Serologic testing
Of 64 facilities, 35 (55%) reported that they did not know whether
they would consider a positive immunoglobulin G (IgG) result
indicative of COVID-19 immunity. Of these 64 facilities, 22
(34%) responded that they would consider a positive serologic test
indicative of immunity, 4 (6%) indicated that they would not con-
sider it indicative of immunity, and 3 (5%) responded “other” (ie, if
neutralizing antibody titers are available, if knowledge improves
the correlation of a positive test with immunity, or in combination
with a polymerase chain reaction [PCR] test to confirm infectivity).
Facilities with higher COVID-19 test positivity rates were more
likely to consider a positive serologic test as evidence for immunity
(compared to “don’t know,” “no,” or “other”), though this associ-
ation was not significant (OR, 1.23; 95% CI, 0.70–2.18).
Visitors
Of the 64 facilities that completed this section of the survey, 5 (8%)
allowed visitors for patients with suspected or confirmedCOVID-19
in all circumstances, 15 (23%) did not allow visitors, and 44 (69%)
allowed visitors in certain circumstances (Table 5). Of these 64 facili-
ties, 45 (70%) allowed end-of-life visits, and 4 (9%) were flexible in
the number of visitors (eg, immediate family was allowed >1 visitor
if 1 person at a time, or as determined on a case-by-case basis)
(Table 5). Of all 37 facilities that allowed birthing partners, 36 (97%)
permitted 1 visitor per patient. Moreover, 34 of 40 facilities (85%)
allowed 1 visitor to a pediatric patient, in most cases the parent;
6 of 40 facilities (15%) allowed 2 visitors for minors. Among respon-
dents that allowed visitors of suspected or confirmed COVID-19
patients, 41 of 45 facilities (91%) required visitors to wear PPE,
especially during end-of-life visits (Table 5). Facilities with higher
positive COVID-19 test rates were more likely to expressly prohibit
visitors for patients with suspected or confirmedCOVID-19, though
this association was not significant (OR, 1.54; 95% CI, 0.82–2.88).
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Table 3. Use of N95 or Equivalent Respirator by Procedure Type
Procedure











Respirator Allowed but Not
Recommended
Nasopharyngeal (NP) Swabs
In-room 44 (63.8) 25 (36.2) 57 (82.6) 6 (8.7) 11 (30.6) 11 (30.6) 15 (41.7) 3 (8.3)
Outdoor 40 (58.0) 25 (36.0) 55 (79.7) 5 (7.2) 11 (30.6) 10 (27.8) 15 (41.7) 2 (5.6)
Upper and Lower Airway
Intubation 66 (95.6) 1 (1.4) 49 (71.0) 1 (1.4) 26 (72.2) 5 (13.9) 18 (50.0) 4 (11.1)
Bronchoscopy 66 (95.6) 2 (2.9) 48 (69.6) 0 25 (69.4) 3 (8.3) 17 (47.2) 4 (11.1)
Extubation 65 (94.2) 2 (2.9) 49 (71.0) 1 (1.4) 24 (66.7) 6 (16.7) 17 (47.2) 5 (13.9)
ENT surgery 63 (91.3) 4 (5.8) 48 (69.6) 1 (1.4) 22 (61.1) 5 (13.9) 16 (44.4) 3 (8.3)
Bag masking 62 (89.9) 4 (5.8) 49 (71.0) 1 (1.4) 20 (55.6) 8 (22.2) 16 (44.4) 4 (11.1)
ENT scope 62 (89.9) 1 (1.4) 48 (69.6) 0 20 (55.6) 6 (16.7) 16 (44.4) 3 (8.3)
HFOV 59 (85.5) 3 (4.3) 45 (65.2) 1 (1.4) 14 (38.9) 8 (22.2) 12 (33.3) 2 (5.6)
Induction of sputum 59 (85.5) 4 (5.8) 48 (69.6) 1 (1.4) 18 (50.0) 7 (10.1) 15 (41.7) 2 (5.6)
Medication via nebulizer 58 (84.1) 3 (4.3) 47 (68.1) 1 (1.4) 13 (36.1) 9 (13.0) 12 (33.3) 2 (5.6)
Noninvasive ventilation 57 (82.6) 7 (10.1) 46 (66.7) 1 (1.4) 13 (36.1) 10 (14.5) 13 (36.1) 2 (5.6)
HFNO with
humidification
56 (81.2) 7 (10.1) 46 (66.7) 1 (1.4) 11 (30.6) 9 (13.0) 12 (33.3) 2 (5.6)
When ventilator circuits
are broken
54 (78.3) 8 (11.6) 47 (68.1) 1 (1.4) 12 (33.3) 10 (14.5) 14 (38.9) 2 (5.6)
Chest compressions 54 (78.3) 7 (10.1) 46 (66.7) 1 (1.4) 11 (30.6) 13 (18.8) 16 (44.4) 3 (8.3)
Use of secretion-
clearing devices
54 (78.3) 8 (11.6) 47 (68.1) 2 (2.9) 12 (33.3) 12 (17.4) 15 (41.7) 2 (5.6)
HFNO without
humidification
53 (76.8) 7 (10.1) 47 (68.1) 1 (1.4) 11 (30.6) 9 (13.0) 11 (30.6) 2 (5.6)
Video-assisted
thorascopic surgery
51 (73.9) 10 (14.5) 43 (62.3) 0 13 (36.1) 9 (13.0) 13 (36.1) 2 (5.6)
Presence of
tracheostomy
46 (66.7) 13 (18.8) 50 (72.5) 4 (5.8) 10 (27.8) 13 (18.8) 14 (38.9) 1 (2.8)
Chest tube placement 37 (53.6) 22 (31.9) 46 (66.7) 4 (5.8) 8 (22.2) 13 (18.8) 12 (33.3) 2 (5.6)
Obstetric and neonatal
Caesarean section 35 (50.7) 19 (27.5) 46 (66.7) 3 (4.3) 8 (22.2) 14 (38.9) 15 (41.7) 4 (11.1)
2nd stage of labor 32 (46.4) 19 (27.5) 45 (65.2) 2 (2.9) 8 (22.2) 13 (36.1) 15 (41.7) 4 (11.1)
Nonsurgical delivery 30 (43.5) 23 (33.3) 45 (65.2) 2 (2.9) 6 (16.7) 15 (41.7) 15 (41.7) 5 (13.9)
Care of preterm babies
in isolates with NIV




28 (40.6) 19 (27.5) 39 (56.5) 4 (5.8) 5 (13.9) 14 (38.9) 13 (36.1) 3 (8.3)
CABG with redo
sternotomy
28 (40.6) 20 (29.0) 40 (58.0) 4 (5.8) 5 (13.9) 15 (41.7) 13 (36.1) 3 (8.3)
Electrocautery
Electrocautery of blood 27 (39.1) 23 (33.3) 46 (66.7) 5 (7.2) 2 (5.6) 17 (47.2) 12 (33.3) 3 (8.3)
Electrocautery of GI
tissue
30 (43.5) 22 (31.9) 47 (68.1) 5 (7.2) 3 (8.3) 17 (47.2) 13 (36.1) 3 (8.3)
Electrocautery of other
body fluids
27 (39.1) 25 (36.2) 46 (66.7) 5 (7.2) 2 (5.6) 18 (50.0) 13 (36.1) 4 (11.1)
Other
Endoscopy 46 (66.7) 15 (21.7) 45 (65.2) 4 (5.8) 13 (36.1) 12 (33.3) 16 (44.4) 5 (13.9)
Laparoscopy 32 (46.4) 25 (36.2) 46 (66.7) 3 (4.3) 7 (19.4) 16 (44.4) 14 (38.9) 5 (13.9)
Neurosurgery 34 (49.3) 26 (37.7) 47 (68.1) 4 (5.8) 5 (13.9) 16 (44.4) 14 (38.9) 5 (13.9)
Note. ENT, ear, nose, throat; HFOV, High-frequency oscillating ventilation; HFNO, High-flow nasal oxygen; CABG, coronary artery bypass grafting; NIV, noninvasive ventilation; GI, gastrointestinal.
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Healthcare personnel policies
Symptom screening of healthcare personnel
Of the 69 responding SRN facilities, 45 (65%) reported that they
were doing HCP symptom checks once daily and 7 (10%) reported
checking symptoms twice daily. COVID-19 test positivity rates
were positively but not significantly associated with the absence
of a symptom screening policy for HCP (OR, 1.28; 95% CI,
0.52–2.03). Two facilities reported that they were conducting daily
PCR testing of HCP, and 44 (64%) reported doing contact tracing
for COVID-19–positive healthcare personnel. Of these 44 facilities,
31 (70%) did this for all COVID-19–positive HCP in the facility.
Return to work
Of the 66 facilities that completed this part of the survey, 34 (52%)
reported following the CDC non–test-based return-to-work
criteria.10 The survey was conducted during a time when the
CDC updated its return to work guidance for healthcare personnel,
adding a preference for the use of the test-based strategy.10 Of these
66 facilities, 15 (23%) followed the CDC test-based return-to-work
criteria, 21 (32%) used crisis-level mitigation strategies with evalu-
ation by the occupational health department, and 3 (5%) used
crisis-level mitigation strategies with certain restrictions. Also,
6 of these 66 facilities (9%) reported using >1 strategy.
Scrubs, laundering, and onsite accommodations
Of 69 responding facilities, 37 (54%) indicated that they provided
scrubs for HCP; 32 (46%) had facility laundering of scrubs at
the end of shifts, and 23 (33%) offered an onsite shower for
HCP at the end of shifts. Also, 25 facilities (36%) provided onsite
or local accommodations during the pandemic, and 17 (68%) of
Table 4. Preprocedural Testing on Asymptomatic Patients (n= 42)
Procedure Type
Facilities Testing,
No. (%) Specific Examples Provided by Respondents
All procedures 9 (21.4) With exception of radiology for one response
Upper airway 9 (21.4) ENT, tracheostomy, bronchoscopy, intubation
Labor and delivery 6 (14.3) Including vaginal, Cesarean section, scheduled
Endoscopy 5 (11.9) Upper endoscopy, colonoscopy, ERCP, EUS, laparoscopy, peritoneal insufflation, GI endoscopy
Lower airway 5 (11.9) Intrathoracic, interventional pulmonary, bronchoscopy, pulmonary
Aerosol-generating procedures 4 (9.5) Specifically written by respondent as “aerosol-generating procedure” by respondent
Sedation 4 (9.5) General endotracheal anesthesia
Multiple procedures (unspecified) 4 (9.5)
All admissions 3 (7.1)
Cardiac 3 (7.1) Electrophysiology, cardiac catheter lab, pacemaker, transesophageal echo test
Chemotherapy 3 (7.1) Lymphodepleting therapy
Dental/facial 2 (4.8) Oral and maxillofacial surgery
Elective surgery 2 (4.8) Including if surgery could be postponed or clinical treatment altered based on positive test
Gastrointestinal 2 (4.8) Intra-abdominal
Transplant 2 (4.8) Allograft, pretransplant, autologous stem cell transplant
Emergency surgery 1 (2.4) Within 48 h
Neurologic 1 (2.4) Electroconvulsive therapy
Note. ENT, ear, nose, and throat; ERCP, endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography; EUS, endoscopic ultrasound.
Table 5. Visitors of Patients Suspected or Confirmed for COVID-19
Characteristic Facilities, No./Total (%) Visitors, No. (No./Total, %) PPE Required, No./Total (%)
Visitors not allowed for COVID-19 patients 15/64 (23.4) N/A N/A
Some or all visitors allowed 49/64 (76.6) N/A N/A
Visitors allowed for all COVID-19 patients 5/64 (7.8) N/A N/A






Birthing partnersa 37/63 (58.7) 1 (36/37, 97.3)
2 (1/37, 2.7)
28/37 (75.7)
Pediatric patientsa 40/63 (63.4) 1 (34/40, 85)
2 (6/40, 15)
31/40 (77.5)
aOne facility opted out of the question regarding birthing partners and pediatric patients.
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these accommodations being for HCP working in COVID-19,
ICU, or ED units. These policies often co-occurred. For example,
of the 38 facilities reporting the availability of laundry, showers, or
onsite accommodations, 25 of these 38 (66%) provided >1. Higher
COVID-19 test positivity rates were positively but not significantly
associated with these 3 policies: showers (OR, 1.33; 95% CI,
0.69–2.50), laundry (OR, 1.22; 95% CI, 0.63–2.35) and lodging
(OR, 1.33; 95% CI, 0.70–2.54).
Ethical guidance sought for clinical or policy decisions
Facilities reported receiving ethical guidance, primarily from
their institutions. Of the 69 responding facilities, 44 (64%) received
guidance on potential COVID-19 therapeutics, 46 (67%) received
guidance on PPE optimization strategies, 42 (61%) received guid-
ance on patient triage, 35 (51%) received guidance on modifica-
tions, and 44 (64%) received guidance on visitor policies. States
provided ethical guidance related to PPE optimization to 23 facili-
ties (33%), states provided ethical guidance related to visitor policies
to 23 facilities (33%), and states provided ethical guidance related to
patient triage to 21 facilities (30%). Ethical guidance issued by pro-
fessional organizations focused on potential COVID-19 therapeutics
in 21 facilities (30%), on PPE optimization in 22 facilities (32%), and
on patient triage in 16 facilities (23%). Of the topics in the survey for
which facilities reported having received ethical guidance, PPE opti-
mization was themost common from institutions, states, and profes-
sional organizations. Among all 69 respondents, 6 (9%) reported
seeking guidance on equipment modifications, 5 (7% reported seek-
ing guidance on therapeutics, and 5 (7%) reported seeking guidance
on PPE optimization.
Discussion
The findings of this survey illustrate how healthcare epidemiolo-
gists and infection control programs have adapted practices and
policies in real time in response to emerging evidence, limited
supplies, and divergent recommendations by public health author-
ities and professional organizations in essential frontline infection
prevention practices during the COVID-19 pandemic. The data
show areas of consistency, for example, utilization of N95 respira-
tors (or equivalent) for upper and lower airway surgeries, as well as
areas in which practices varied (eg, types of PPE used by HCP
for nasopharyngeal swabbing). Variation in the type of isolation
precautions used for certain procedures during the COVID-19
pandemic was higher than expected among healthcare facilities
dealing with other viral respiratory pathogens. This finding pro-
vides insight into the complexity faced by healthcare facilities as
they worked to synthesize rapidly emerging scientific information
while managing turbulent practical circumstances and varying rec-
ommendations from public health and professional organizations.
The collective experiences of SRN facilities may help (1) flag poten-
tial challenges for others to help them anticipate decision points,
(2) them affirm their current practices in similar circumstances,
and (3) identify areas for improved coordination from the
international to local level for this pandemic and future outbreaks
of emerging pathogens.
Approaches unique to the COVID-19 pandemic
The SRN facilities identified and employed numerous strategies
unique to the pandemic to maintain safety standards, including
the following: extended use of disposable respirators beyond 1
day; respirators worn in combination with masks (surgical, cloth)
to preserve them; storage of disposable respirators by the user in a
paper bag between uses; reprocessing of disposable respirators via
hydrogen peroxide vapor, ethylene oxide, UV irradiation, or moist
heat treatments; self-production of PPE; self-production of test kits
and testing materials; and extended use of disposable gowns.
The survey did not assess the time and resources that were
required to conceive of, vet, obtain materials for, and implement
these new approaches to optimizing healthcare supplies. However,
the burden of doing this across settings, types of procedures, patients,
healthcare roles, and local circumstances represents substantial
opportunity cost at a time when healthcare facilities were under
strain to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to the pandemic.
These challenges also include implementing unfamiliar practices
for HCP, such as long durations of extended use of disposable res-
pirators and gowns. Additional opportunity costs may be inferred
based on the resources dedicated by healthcare agencies such as
the CDC to rapidly issue guidance to facilities struggling with supply
limitations, and based on responses by professional organizations
speaking on behalf of their memberships through guidelines, state-
ments, and advocacy efforts.
Future considerations and research needs
Local, national, and global communities face unknowns, among
themwhether SARS-CoV-2 triggers lasting neutralizing antibodies
that prevent subsequent illness, the feasibility and timing of a
COVID-19 vaccine, the effects of seasonal changes, and the impact
of reopening different sectors of society. The COVID-19 pandemic
has compelled institutions to take rapid, often practical actions that
would benefit from further study and evaluation for safety, effec-
tiveness, and cost. Several areas of research and evaluation are
needed to assess what has been done so far and to find ways to
strengthen facilities and their communities to prepare for the
potential for new waves of COVID-19 cases and future outbreaks
of emerging pathogens.
Approximately two-thirds of survey participants have received
guidance from their institutions regarding potential therapies for
COVID-19, PPE optimization strategies, patient triage, and visitor
policies. However, only about one-third of survey participants
received guidance from states and professional societies in these
areas. These findings suggest the potential for these entities to take
into account a broader view of the dilemmas faced by the health-
care community as well as the potential role for multidisciplinary
considerations when developing and disseminating guidance.
Perhaps further supporting the suggestion for better collaboration
among multidisciplinary groups, the survey results revealed that
PPE optimization was the most frequent topic covered in ethical
guidance issued by institutions, states, and professional organiza-
tions. At the same time, it was the second most frequent topic on
which facilities had sought guidance. Thus, more groups making
recommendations on a critical topic may not lead to more clarity
for facilities.
The impact of visitor policies enacted during the pandemic
present additional areas for research. Although most SRN facilities
allowed visitors for patients with suspected or confirmed COVID-19
disease at the end of life, as well as for minors and for birthing
mothers, many reported limiting visitors to 1 per patient and
required these visitors to wear PPE. The 2015 SHEA expert guidance
“Isolation Precautions for Visitors” cites studies that have implicated
visitors in hospital outbreaks, but it also notes the potential for neg-
ative psychosocial impact on patients and families from isolation
practices.11 Research is needed to understand how patient outcomes
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have been affected by the isolation strategies put in place during the
pandemic.
Many of the practices noted in this survey affect the amount of
supplies available to the facility. Most facilities reported universal
HCP respirator use in certain locations. Approximately half of
respondents also indicated universal surgical masking for health-
care personnel facility-wide. The effectiveness of these strategies
should be assessed for future planning. In addition, a number of
facilities mentioned allowingHCP to use respirators during certain
procedures on non–COVID-19 patients, even when not recom-
mended. Research needs to be done on the impact of this practice
on PPE utilization and COVID-19 transmission. In addition,
research should examine the cost–benefit and safety of the various
contingency strategies rapidly enacted during the pandemic due to
sudden resource constraints (eg, extending the use of respirators
beyond 1 day, storing respirators in paper bags, and reprocessing
respirators). Finally, more information is needed regarding the
utility of testing asymptomatic individuals prior to procedures
or prior to discharge to skilled nursing facilities or hemodialysis
units to better understand the impact of this type of testing on case
detection and care for non–COVID-19 health conditions.
The study has several limitations. Although the survey
addressed policies for testing of hospitalized versus nonhospital-
ized patients, other questions did not address inpatient versus
outpatient settings. The survey did not differentiate between types
of disposable respirators, and it applied the terms “reuse” and
“extended use” to practices novel to the optimization of PPE
during the pandemic (eg, extended use for a full day, with use again
after storage in a paper bag). The ability to define a specific set of
AGPs currently remains elusive12–14; thus, the survey and manu-
script do not provide a grouping of AGPs.
Although it appears that the implementation of many of these
policies was not driven by COVID-19 prevalence based on facili-
ties’ reported test findings correlated to community prevalence,
this finding should be interpreted with caution. Additionally,
the survey did not collect information regarding whether facilities
experienced a surge of patients. Comparisons of facilities further
apart in prevalence would produce more dramatic effect estimates;
however, all of the estimates are for a single “step up” in COVID-19
prevalence (eg, going from 6%–15% to 16%–25%). The survey
response of 69 individual SRN facilities is not powered to reveal
any particular magnitude of effect but rather to gather information
about current practices. Practices differ based onwhere a particular
community is on the epidemic curve, which can change rapidly.
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